CRISIS: Renewable Energy & Peak Oil
The date an area’s oil production reaches its maximum
Means that about half the oil has been produced
Does not mean “running out of oil”
Does mean a continuous decline in production
When oil half gone, the flow of oil begins to fall
Not like a gas tank
Oil in the ground is not in a pool but in tiny droplets
Droplets move slowly through the earth due to pressure
At halfway point pressure drops – flow decreases
Peak Oil Discoverer: Dr. King Hubbert
Shell Oil Geologist/ Petroleum Scientist
1949 – projected short historical oil period
Triggered by 1930 U.S. discovery peak
1956 – predicted 1970 as U.S. Peak Oil year
Came as predicted
1969 – predicted World Peak Oil year 2000
1970-80 demand decline delayed it
We know the world discovery rate
We know the consumption rate is 5 times the discovery rate
We have a buffer – the reserves
Popular misleading view – “We have reserves for 40 years”
Reserves – estimates by different people with different methods
Published reserve information is inaccurate
Political and financial reason exists to state high or low
OPEC – quotas are set at a % of reserves
Kuwait’s suddenly increased in 1985 – others followed
In 2002 Canada reserves increased from 4.8 Gb to 178 Gb
They Defined tar sands as conventional oil
But tar sands is not oil – must be mined and “cooked”
Jan. 12, 2004 – Shell Oil reduced their reserves 20%
Reduced three more times in 2004
Aug 25, 2004 – Shell Oil fined $151,000,000
Feb. 3, 2005 – Shell Oil reduced reserves for fifth time
Feb. 2004 – Russia declared all oil data a state secret
Oil companies (and countries) hold reserve data confidential
Feb. 2005 – G7 Meeting – “we need to know!”
Saudi Arabia – “We’re not partners – we’re suppliers”
The shocker – no one knows!!! It’s all guesswork
JUST PUMP FASTER, No?
Oil reservoirs can provide oil faster by injecting gas/liquids
Forcing the oil is harmful
Injections may limit ultimate recovery
Depletion occurs suddenly
Saudi Arabia is injecting 7 million barrels sea water daily
That’s why when about half the oil is gone – production must decrease
This is a major concern – can’t predict depletion as well
OIL: BLACK GOLD
Oil reservoirs can provide oil faster by injecting gas/liquids
THE MONEY IMPLICATIONS
As peaking is approached…the economic, social, and political costs will be unprecedented.
…peaking will be extremely complex, involve literally trillions of dollars and require many years of intense effort.
Peaking…will cause protracted economic hardship in the United States and the world.
…the problem of the peaking of world conventional oil production is unlike any yet faced by modern industrial society
US ARMY STATES
As peaking is approached…the economic, social, and political costs will be unprecedented.
peaking will be extremely complex, involve literally trillions of dollars and require many years of intense effort.
Peaking…will cause protracted economic hardship in the United States and the world.
…the problem of the peaking of world conventional oil production is unlike any yet faced by modern industrial society
THE WORLD HAS TO WEAN OFF OIL
As peaking is approached…the economic, social, and political costs will be unprecedented. …peaking will be extremely complex, involve literally trillions of dollars and require many years of intense effort.
PEAK OIL, tough love…
It has taken between 50-300 million years to form, and yet we have managed to burn roughly half of all global oil reserves in merely 125 years or so.
The world now consumes 85 million barrels of oil per day, or 40,000 gallons per second, and demand is growing exponentially.
Oil production in 33 out of 48 out countries has now peaked, including Kuwait, Russia and Mexico. Global oil production is now also approaching an all time peak and can potentially end our Industrial Civilization. The most distinguished and prominent geologists, oil industry experts, energy analysts and organizations all agree that big trouble is brewing.
The world is not running out of oil itself, but rather its ability to produce high-quality cheap and economically extractable oil on demand. After more than fifty years of research and analysis on the subject by the most widely respected & rational scientists, it is now clear that the rate at which world oil producers can extract oil is reaching the maximum level possible. This is what is meant by Peak Oil. With great effort and expenditure, the current level of oil production can possibly be maintained for a few more years, but beyond that oil production must begin a permanent & irreversible decline. The Stone Age did not end because of the lack of stones, and the Oil Age won’t end because of lack of oil. The issue is lack of further growth, followed by gradual, then steep decline. Dr King Hubbert correctly predicted peaking of USA oil production in the 1970′s on this basis.
It is now widely acknowledged by the world’s leading petroleum geologists that more than 95 percent of all recoverable oil has now been found. We therefore know, within a reasonable degree of certainty, the total amount of oil available to us. Any oil well has roughly the same life cycle where the production rate peaks before it goes into terminal decline. This happens when about half of the oil has been recovered from the well. We have consumed approximately half of the world’s total reserve of about 2.5 trillion barrels of conventional oil in the ground when we started drilling the first well at a current rate of over 30 billion a year, meaning the world is nearing its production plateau.
Worldwide discovery of oil peaked in 1964 and has followed a steady decline since. According to industry consultants IHS Energy, 90% of all known reserves are now in production, suggesting that few major discoveries remain to be made. There have been no significant discoveries of new oil since 2002. In 2001 there were 8 large scale discoveries, and in 2002 there were 3 such discoveries. In 2003 there were no large scale discoveries of oil. Given geologists’ sophisticated understanding of the characteristics that would indicate a major oil find, is is highly unlikely that any area large enough to be significant has eluded attention and no amount or kind of technology will alter that. Since 1981 we have consumed oil faster than we have found it, and the gap continues to widen. Developing an area such as the Artic National Wildlife Refuge in Alaska has a ten year lead time and would ultimately produce well under 1% of what the world currently consumes (IEA).
Oil is now being consumed four times faster than it is being discovered, and the situation is becoming critical.
“The consumption of a finite resource is simply a finite venture and the faster we use the quicker it peaks” (M. Simmons)
“Peak oil is now.” German Energy Watch Group –2008
“By 2012, surplus oil production capacity could entirely disappear..…” U.S. Department of Defense –2008 & 2010.
“A global peak is inevitable. The timing is uncertain, but the window is rapidly narrowing.” UK Energy Research Centre -2009
“The next five years will see us face … the oil crunch.” UK Industry Taskforce on Peak Oil and Energy Security –2009
The Saudi Arabia Case
With more than fifty oil-producing countries now in decline, focus on the oil-rich Middle East has sharpened dramatically. Countries of the Middle East have traditionally been able to relieve tight oil markets by increasing production, but, as the this region nears its own oil peak, any relief it can provide is limited and temporary.
Saudi Arabia is a major oil producer with 73% of all incremental world demand being met by this country. The worrying fact is that 90% of their production comes from only 5 mega fields (one is the Ghawar field which is the biggest ever discovered), and are all at risk of unplanned production collapse. In 2004 there were warning signs of production falling into depletion. For years, Aramco, the Saudi national company, use secondary recovery techniques by injecting enormous amounts of seawater (7 million barrels daily) into their biggest field to boost production. These methods have only temporary effects, and lead to accelerated rates of depletion in the future.
Matt Simmons, long time energy analyst who studied energy for 34 years, in his book “Twilight in the Desert” effectively confronts the complacent belief that there are ample oil reserves in Saudi Arabia and has created a compelling case that Saudi Arabia production will soon reach a peak, after which its production will decline and the world will be confronted with a catastrophic oil shortage. The factual basis of the book is over 200 technical papers published over the last 20 years which individually detail problems with particular wells or particular fields, but which collectively demonstrate that the entire Saudi oil system is “old and fraying” with reserves deliberately vastly overestimated.
Geologist Dr Colin Campbell in a 1998 article in Scientific American also details numerous discrepancies about estimates in Middle East reserves. The extent of reserves reported remained amazingly constant from year to year and then jumped dramatically. A similar unexplainable jump occurred in other countries in the Middle East, sometimes even in the total absence of exploration, strongly suggesting that OPEC’s reserves are overstated.
Peak Oil Imminent
The only uncertainty about peak oil is the time scale, which is difficult to predict accurately. Over the years, accurate prediction of oil production was confronted by fluctuating ecological, economical, and political factors, which imposed many restrictions on its exploration, transportation, and supply and demand. At the end of 2009, the Kuwait university and the Kuwait Oil company collaborated in a study to predict the peak date using multicylic models, depending on the historical 2 oil production trend and known oil reserves of 47 major oil production countries, to overcome the limitations and restrictions associated with other previous models. Based on this model, world production is estimated to peak in 2014. Other experts, oil companies and analyst firm estimate the peak date between now and around 2020. What’s certain is that the global production will go into a permanent decline within our generation.
“One of nature’s biggest forces is exponential growth”
At a current average global consumption growth rate of 2% annually (1995-2005), by 2025 the world will need 50% more oil (120 mbd), and the International Energy Agency (IEA) admits that Saudi will have to double oil production to achieve this, which is not feasible in even the most optimistic scenario. And that’s not even taking into account that 80% of the world is only just starting to use oil & gas. In recent years, energy demands from mostly emerging economies have increased dramatically in populous countries as their oil consumption per capita grows. The International Energy Agency estimates that 93% of all incremental demand comes from non-OECD countries. Therefore, in time oil prices will continue to rise.
Based on Simmon’s analysis, sudden and sharp oil production declines could happen at any time. Even under the most optimistic scenario, Saudi Arabia may be able to maintain current rates of production for several years, but will not be able to increase production enough to meet the expected increase in world demand. There is no likely scenario that some new frontier can replace Middle East oil declines.
From Wiki leaks it has emerged that Senior Saudi energy officials have privately warned US and European counterparts that Opec would have an “extremely difficult time” meeting demand and that the reserves of Saudi have been overstated by as much as 40%.
Exxon Mobil Corporation, one of the world’s largest publicly owned petroleum companies, is the most forthright of the major oil companies having had the courage and honesty to quietly publish the declining discovery trend, based on sound industry data with reserve revisions properly backdated. Furthermore, the company is running page-size advertisements in European papers stressing the immense challenges to be faced in meeting future energy demand, hinting that the challenges might not be met despite its considerable expertise. Chevron recently joined their campaign publishing an advertisement in national newspapers stating that the ‘Era of Easy Oil is Over’ (see here to view full ad).
“Initially it will be denied. There will be much lying and obfuscation. Then prices will rise and demand will fall. The rich will outbid the poor for available supplies.”
The fallacy of Alternatives
The public, business leaders and politicians are all under the false assumption that oil depletion is a straightforward engineering problem of exactly the kind that technology and human ingenuity have so successfully solved before. Technology itself has become a kind of supernatural force, although in reality it is just the hardware and programming for running that fuel, and governed by the basic laws of physics and thermodynamics. Much of our existing technology simply won’t work without an abundant underlying fossil fuel base. In addition, physicist Jonathan Huebner has concluded in The History of Science and Technology that the rate of innovation in the US peaked in 1873, and the current rate of innovation is about the same as it was in 1600. According to Huebner, by 2024 it will have slumped to the same level as it was in the Dark Ages. Hence, without sufficient innovation and a comfortable surplus of fossil fuels, we may simply lack the tools to move forward.
With this energy base dwindling, there is simply not enough time to replace a fluid so cheap, abundant and versatile. It is rich in energy, easy to use, store, and transport. Nothing has the bang for the buck of oil, and nothing can replace it in time – either separately or in combination. Wind, waves and other renewables are all pretty marginal and also take a lot of energy to construct and require a petroleum platform to work off.
Natural gas is a diminishing resource as well and cannot satisfy the growing demand for energy. US Gas supplies were so low in 2003 after a harsh winter that to preserve life and property supplies were close to being cut off to manufacturers, electric plants and lastly homes.
Ethanol has a net energy value of zero (not accounting for soil and water damage and other costs due to unsustainable agricultural practices) – it is subsidized as a boon to agribusiness and would have a negligible effect (Prindle, ACEEE).
Solar energy produces marginal net energy, but are still decades away at best from being a viable substitute given the recent rate of progress in efficiency and costs (averaging about five percent a year) and is nowhere ready to meet the world’s energy needs. (editor: big changes since 2009 have seen PVC prices drop 60% and efficienct gains dramatic through 2020 so is now at cost parity with natural gas)
More importantly, solar photovoltaic cells (PVC) are built from hydrocarbon feed stocks and therefore require excess resources. It is estimated that a global solar energy system would take a century to build and would consume a major portion of world iron production (Foreign Affairs, Rhodes).
The widespread belief that hydrogen is going to save the day is a good example of how delusional people have become. Hydrogen fuel cells are not an energy source at all, but are more properly termed a form of energy storage. Free hydrogen does not exist on this planet. It requires more energy to break a hydrogen bond than will ever be garnered from that free hydrogen. The current source of hydrogen is natural gas – that is, a hydrocarbon. In the envisioned system of solar PVC & hydrogen fuel cells, every major component of the system, from the PVC to the fuel cells themselves will require hydrocarbon energy and feedstocks. The oil age will never be replaced by a hydrogen fuel-cell economy.
Coal is abundant, but its net energy profile is poor compared to oil and its conversion process to synthetic fuels is very inefficient. Coal would have to be mined at much higher rates to replace declining oil field. In addition, coal production is extremely harmful to the environment. One large coal burning electric plant releases enough radioactive material in a year to build two atomic bombs, apart from emitting more greenhouse gases than any other fuels. Coal is implicated in mercury pollution that causes 60.000 cases of brain damage in newborn children every year in the USA. Resorting to coal would be a very big step backwards and what we may face then may be more like the Dim Ages. More importantly, coal is distributed very unevenly with the top three countries (China, USA, USSR) possessing almost 70% of total. Much of the current oil and gas supply is in low-population countries, such as Saudi Arabia, that cannot possibly use all of the production for themselves. They are hence quite willing, indeed eager, to sell it to other countries. When oil and gas are gone, and only coal remains, and the few (large-population) countries that possess it need all of it for their own populations, it will be interesting to see how much is offered for sale to other countries.
Obtaining usable oil from tar sands requires huge amounts of energy, as it has to be mined and washed with super hot water. From an energy balance, it takes the equivalence of two barrels of oil to produce three, which is still positive but poor in terms of energy economics. In the early days of conventional oil, this ratio used to be one to thirty.
Nuclear power plants are simply too expensive and take ten years to build, relying on a fossil fuel platform for all stages of construction, maintenance, and extracting & processing nuclear fuels. Additionally, uranium is also a rare and finite source with its own production peak. Since 2006, the uranium price has already more than doubled.
Fossil fuels allowed us to operate highly complex systems at gigantic scales. Renewables are simply incompatible in this context and the new fuels and technologies required would simply take a lot more time to develop than available and require access to abundant supplies of cheap fossil fuels, putting the industrial adventure out of business.
In an interview with The Times, former Shell CEO Jeroen van der Veer calls for a “reality check” and warns that the world’s energy crisis cannot be solved by renewables. “Contrary to public perceptions, renewable energy is not the silver bullet that will soon solve all our problems. Just when energy demand is surging, many of the world’s conventional oilfields are going into decline. The world is blinding itself to the reality of its energy problems, ignoring the scale of growth in demand from developing countries and placing too much faith in renewable sources of power”.
Alternative energies will never replace fossil fuels at the scale, rate and manner at which the world currently consumes them, and humankind’s ingenuity will simply not overcome the upper limits of geology & physics.
Current Global Energy Production: No substitutes can replace fossil fuels at the same scale & rate at which the world currently use them
In September 2007
Paul Chefurka is a big picture thinker, and suggests a possible collapse in population through 2100… (see population post, and offers a fascinating energy outlook below.
World Energy to 2050
Forty Years of Decline
This article supercedes an earlier work, “World Energy and Population: Trends to 2100″. Compared to that paper this article offers a more comprehensive look at the world’s evolving energy supply picture and confines its projections to the first half of the century. Also unlike that earlier work, this article makes no assumptions about changes in human population due directly to reductions in the world’s energy supply. At the end of the article I will briefly examine one highly probable effect the decline in total energy would have on the quality of human life.
The analysis is intended to clarify a future energy supply scenario based purely on the situation as it now exists and the directions it shows obvious signs of taking. The model is not intended to show the effects of any of the large-scale changes in direction that have been proposed to cope with declining oil and gas supplies or rising CO2 levels. Solar or nuclear power “Manhattan Project” style efforts, for example, are not considered. Treat this scenario as a cautionary tale: given the known resource constraints in energy, this is the likely outcome if we don’t take collective action but rather just continue business as usual.
This article will not present any prescriptive measures for either supply or demand management. You will not find any specific suggestions for what we ought to do, or any proposals based on the assumption that we can radically alter the behaviour of people or institutions over the short term. While the probability of such changes will increase if the global situation shifts dramatically, such considerations would introduce a level of uncertainty into the analysis that would make it conceptually intractable. The same constraint holds true for new technologies. You will not find any discussion of fusion or hydrogen power, for example.
Throughout history, the expansion of human civilization has been supported by a steady growth in our use of high-quality exosomatic energy. This growth has been driven by our increasing population and our increasing level of activity. As we learned to harness the energy sources around us we progressed from horse-drawn plows, hand forges and wood fires to our present level of mechanization with its wide variety of high-density energy sources. As industrialization has progressed around the world, the amount of energy each one of us uses has also increased, with the global average per capita consumption of all forms of energy rising by 50% in the last 40 years alone.
This rosy vision of continuous growth has recently been challenged by the theory of “Peak Oil”, which concludes that the amount of oil and natural gas being extracted from the earth will shortly start an irreversible decline. As that decline progresses we will have to depend increasingly on other energy sources to power our civilization. In this article I will offer a glimpse into that changed energy future. I hope to be able to provide a realistic assessment of the evolution of the global energy supply picture, and to estimate how much of the various types of energy we will have available to us in the coming decades.
The analysis in this article is supported by a model of trends in energy production. The model is based on historical data of actual energy production, connected to projections drawn from the thinking of various expert energy analysts as well as my own interpretation of future directions and some purely mathematical projections.
The current global energy mix consists of oil (36%), natural gas (24%), coal (28%), nuclear (6%), hydro (6%) and renewable energy such as biomass, wind and solar (about 2%). Historical production in each category (except for renewable energy) has been taken from the BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2007. In order to permit comparison between categories I use a standard measure called the tonne of oil equivalent (toe). Using this measure, well-known conversion factors for thermal and electrical energy production permit the different energy sources to be easily compared.
Our Energy Sources
The analysis of our oil supply starts from the recognition that it is finite, non-renewable, and subject to effects which will result in a declining production rate in the near future. This situation is popularly known as Peak Oil. The key concept of Peak Oil is that after we have extracted about half the total amount of oil in place the rate of extraction will reach a peak and then begin an irreversible decline.
This peak and decline happens both for individual oil fields and for larger regions like countries, but for different reasons. In individual oil fields the phenomenon is caused by geological factors inherent to the structure of the oil reservoir. At the national or global level it is caused by logistical factors. When we start producing oil from a region, we usually find and develop the biggest, most accessible oil fields first. As they go into decline and we try to replace the lost production, the available new fields tend to be smaller with lower production rates that don’t compensate for the decline of the large fields they are replacing.
Oil fields follow a size distribution consisting of a very few large fields and a great many smaller ones. This distribution is illustrated by the fact that 60% of the world’s oil supply is extracted from only 1% of the world’s active oil fields. As one of these very large fields plays out it can require the development of hundreds of small fields to replace its production.
The theory behind Peak Oil is widely available on the Internet, and some introductory references are given here, here and here. In addition, the German organization Energy Watch Group provides an exceptionally comprehensive (but still accessible) overview of the topic in the Executive Summary of their recently released study of Peak Oil.
There is much debate over when we should expect global oil production to peak and what the subsequent rate of decline might be. While the rate of decline is still hotly contested, the timing of the peak has become less controversial. Recently a number of very well informed people have declared that the peak has arrived. This brave band includes such people as billionaire investor T. Boone Pickens, energy investment banker Matthew Simmons (author of the book “Twilight in the Desert” that deconstructs the state of the Saudi Arabian oil reserves), retired geologist Ken Deffeyes (a colleague of Peak Oil legend M. King Hubbert) and Dr. Samsam Bakhtiari (a former senior scientist with the National Iranian Oil Company). This view is also supported by the extremely detailed analysis published by the Energy Watch Group mentioned above.
My position is in agreement with these luminaries: the peak is happening as I write these words (in late 2007). I have confirmed its occurrence to my own satisfaction by examining the pattern of oil production and oil prices over the last three years. I discovered in the process that crude oil production peaked in May 2005 and has shown no growth since then despite a doubling in price and a dramatic surge in exploration activity.
The post-peak decline rate is another question. The best guides we have are the performances of oil fields and countries that are known to be already in decline. Unfortunately, those decline rates vary all over the map. The United States, for instance, has been in decline since 1970 and has lost 40% of its production capacity since then, for a decline rate of about 2% per year. On the other hand, the North Sea basin is showing an annual decline around 10%, and the giant Cantarell field in Mexico is losing production at rates approaching 20% per year.
In order to create a realistic decline model for the world’s oil, I have chosen to follow the approach of the Energy Watch Group, which is similar in profile to the projections of Dr. Bakhtiari in his WOCAP model . Both assume a gradually increasing decline rate over time, starting off very gently and ramping up as the years go by. The main difference is that the EWG model is slightly less aggressive than WOCAP. WOCAP predicts that production will fall from its current value of 4000 million tonnes of oil per year (Mtoe/yr) to 2750 Mtoe/yr in 2020, while the EWG projects a decline to 2900 Mtoe/yr by then. The EWG projects an oil supply of just under 2000 Mtoe in 2030. My model projects a decline rate increasing from 1% per year in 2010 to a constant rate of 5% per year after 2025, resulting in an average decline rate of 4% per year between now and 2050. In 2050 oil production is only 18% of what it is today, as shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Global Oil Production, 1965 to 2050
Keep in mind that Peak Oil is primarily a transportation fuel problem. Almost 70% of the world’s oil is used in transportation as gasoline, diesel fuel, jet fuel and bunker fuel for ships. Right now there is a lot of excitement surrounding the development of electric cars. However, the immediacy of the peak and the slope of the following decline suggest that it may prove difficult to replace enough of the global automobile fleet in the time available to maintain the ubiquitous personal mobility we have become used to. Europe and Asia are placing a lot of emphasis on electrifying inter-city rail and urban mass transit. Rail electrification seems like a sensible initiative that should be pursued urgently by all nations.
The supply situation with natural gas is very similar to that of oil. This similarity makes sense because oil and gas come from the same biological source and tend to be found in similar geological formations. Gas and oil wells are drilled using very similar equipment. The differences between oil and gas have everything to do with the fact that oil is a viscous liquid while natural gas is, well, a gas.
While oil and gas will both exhibit production peaks, the slope of the post-peak decline for gas will be significantly steeper due to its lower viscosity. To help understand why, imagine two identical balloons, one filled with water and the other with air. If you set them down and let go of their necks, the air-filled balloon will empty much faster than the one filled with water. Even though oil and gas reservoirs are made up of porous rock rather than being big pockets of liquid or gas, they behave in much the same way. Because of its viscosity, oil reservoirs often require their internal pressure to be raised over time by pumping in water, in order to force out the oil and maintain their flow rates. In contrast, when a gas reservoir is pierced by the well, the gas flows out rapidly under its own pressure. As the reservoir empties the flow can be kept relatively constant until the gas is gone, when the flow will suddenly stop.
Gas reservoirs show the same size distribution as oil reservoirs. As with oil, we found and drilled the big ones, in the most accessible locations, first. The reservoirs that are coming on-line now are getting progressively smaller, requiring a larger number of wells to be drilled to recover the same volume of gas. For example, the number of gas wells drilled in Canada between 1998 and 2004 went up by 400% (from 4,000 wells in 1998 to 16,000 wells in 2004), while the annual production stayed constant. These considerations mean that the natural gas supply will exhibit a similar bell-shaped curve to what we saw for oil. In fact, the production of natural gas peaked in the United States in 2001, and in Canada in 2002. In addition, the remaining large gas and oil deposits are in less and less accessible locations, making the extraction of their reserves slower and more expensive.
One other difference between oil and gas is the nature of their global export markets. Compared to oil, the gas market is quite small due to the difficulty in transporting gases compared to liquids. While oil can be simply pumped into tankers and back out again, natural gas must first be liquefied (which takes substantial energy), transported in special tankers at low temperature and high pressure, then re-gasified at the destination which requires yet more energy. As a result most of the world’s natural gas is shipped by pipeline, which pretty well limits gas to national and continental markets. This constraint has an important implication: if a continent’s gas supply runs low it is very difficult to supplement it with gas from somewhere else that is still well-supplied.
The peak of world gas production may not occur until 2025, but two things are sure: we will have even less warning than we had for Peak Oil, and the subsequent decline rates may be shockingly high. I have chosen 2025 as the global peak (20 years after Peak Oil). The peak is followed by a rapid increase in decline to 10% per year by 2050, for an average decline rate of 6% per year. In 2050 gas production is projected to be only 24% of its current value. The production curve for natural gas is shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Global Natural Gas Production, 1965 to 2050
One of the big concerns regarding a decrease in global natural gas supplies has to be about its role in the production of ammonia for fertilizer. Currently 4% of the world’s natural gas is used for fertilizer production (the largest uses are as industrial and residential heat sources, and for electricity generation). As the gas supply declines the price will automatically rise and fertilizer prices will go along for the ride. Rising fertilizer prices will have dire consequences in a world whose expanding population needs to be fed, where much of the land would not be able to sustain its current production levels without artificial fertilizer, and where the largest population increases will occur in the poorest nations with the least productive soils.
It is possible to produce the hydrogen required to make ammonia (the feedstock for most fertilizer) from other sources – coal and electrolysis are often mentioned. There are substantial risks associated with those approaches, though. The cost of hydrogen from alternative sources is still considerably higher than for hydrogen made from methane, pricing any resulting fertilizer out of the reach of those who need it most. Making hydrogen from coal will also generate greenhouse gases as the carbon is burned for process heat. Electrolysis depends on having cheap sources of surplus electricity available, electricity that is not being used for higher priorities. As will become clear below, there is a strong posibility that such surpluses will never materialize, especially if the natural gas currently being used for electricity generation needs to be replaced by other sources.
Oil and Gas Combined
Oil and natural gas are the world’s primary fuel sources, used for both transportation and heat. Together they supply a full 60% of the energy currently used by humanity. According to this model, their combined energy peak will come in 2012, at 6679 Mtoe. By 2050 they will be producing a combined energy of only 1386 Mtoe. This represents a drop of 80%. To the extent that we cannot replace this shortfall through novel uses of electricity from other sources, this decline represents an enormous challenge. It is a challenge that seems destined to alter the fundamental shape of our civilization over the next three or four decades.
Coal is the ugly stepsister of fossil fuels. It has a terrible environmental reputation, going back to its first widespread use in Britain in the 1700s. London’s coal-fired “peasoup” fogs were notorious, and damaged the health of hundreds of thousands of people. Nowadays the concern is less about soot and ash than about the acid rain, mercury and especially carbon dioxide that results from burning coal. For the same amount of energy released, coal produces more CO2 than either oil or gas. From an energy production standpoint coal has the advantage of very great abundance. Of course that very abundance is a huge negative when considered from the perspective of global warming.
Most coal today is used to generate electricity. As economies grow, so does their demand for electricity. The need to use electricity to replace some of the energy lost due to the decline of oil and natural gas will put yet more upward pressure on the demand for coal. At the moment China is installing two to three new coal-fired power plants per week, and has plans to continue at that pace for at least the next decade.
Just as we saw with oil and gas, coal will exhibit an energy peak and decline, though for different reasons. One important factor in the eventual decline of the energy obtained from burning coal is that we have in the past concentrated on finding and using the highest grade of coal: anthracite. Much of what remains consists of lower grade bituminous and lignite. These grades of coal produce less energy when burned, and require the mining of ever more coal to get the same amount of energy.
In addition to their exemplary study of oil supplies mentioned above, the Energy Watch Group has also conducted an extensiveanalysis of coal use over the next century. I have adopted their “best case” conclusions for this model. The model projects a continued rise in the use of coal to a peak in 2025. As global warming begins to have serious effects there will be mounting pressure to reduce coal use. Unfortunately, due to its abundance and our need to replace some of the energy lost from the depletion of oil and gas, the decline in coal use will not be as dramatic as seen with those fossil fuels. The model has coal use decreasing evenly from its peak to a production level similar to what it is today, giving the curve shown in Figure 5.
Figure 5: Global Coal Production, 1965 to 2050
Of course the increased use of coal carries with it the threat of increased global warming due to the continued production of CO2. Many hopeful words have been written about the possibility of alleviating that worry by implementing Carbon Capture and Storage. CCS usually involves the capture and compression of CO2 from power plant exhaust, which is then pumped into played-out gas fields for long term storage. This technology is still in the experimental stage, and there is much skepticism surrounding the security and economics of storing such enormous quantities of CO2 in porous rock strata.
If coal is the ugly stepsister, hydro is one of the fairy godmothers of the energy story. Environmentally speaking it’s relatively clean, if perhaps not quite as clean as once thought. It has the ability to supply large amounts of electricity quite consistently. The technology is well understood, universally available and not too technically demanding (at least compared to nuclear power). Dams and generators last a long time.
It has its share of problems, though they tend to be quite localized. Destruction of habitat due to flooding, the release of CO2 and methane from flooded vegetation, and the disruption of river flows are the primary issues. In terms of further development the main obstacle is that in many places the best hydro sites are already being used. Nevertheless, it is an attractive energy source.
Figure 6: Global Hydro Production, 1965 to 2050
Development will probably continue in the immediate future at a similar pace as in the past. The model for hydro power has its capacity increasing by almost 40% by 2050. This projected growth is gradually constrained toward the middle of the century by two main factors: most useful river sites are already in use, and water flows will gradually be reduced due to global warming. There may also be a general loss of global industrial capacity (and/or rising development costs) due to oil and gas depletion. Nevertheless, the pressure on hydro power to replace energy lost from oil and gas depletion will support continued development even in the face of such constraint.
The graph in Figure 7 is a mix of data synthesis with a bit of projection. I started with a table of reactor ages from the IAEA (reprinted in a presentation to the Association for the Study of Peak Oil and Gas), the table of historical nuclear power production from the BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2007 and a table from the Uranium Information Centre showing the number of reactors that are installed, under construction, planned or proposed worldwide.
The interesting thing about the table of reactor ages is that it shows the vast majority of the world’s operating reactors (361 out of 439 or 82% to be precise) are between 17 and 40 years old. The number of reactors at each age varies of course, but the average number of reactors in each year is about 17. The number actually goes over 30 in a couple of years.
Two realizations formed the basis for my model of nuclear power. The first was that reactors have a finite lifespan averaging around 40 years, which means that a lot of the world’s reactors are rapidly approaching the end of their useful life. The second realization was that the construction rate of new reactors and their average capacity can be inferred from the UIC planning table. We can therefore calculate the approximate world generating capacity with reasonable accuracy out to 2030 or so.
The model takes a generous interpretation of the available data. It assumes we will build all the reactors shown in the UIC data referenced above: six plants per year for the next five years, nine plants per year for the subsequent ten years, and ten plants per year until 2050. The model further assumes that all reactors will be granted life extensions to 50 years from their current 40, and that noplants will be prematurely decommissioned. It also assumes that each plant generates an average output equivalent to 1.53 Mtoe per year. The derivation of this figure is given in the model data available here.
Figure 7: Global Nuclear Production, 1965 to 2100
The drop in output between 2020 and 2037 is the result of new construction not keeping pace with the decommissioning of old reactors. The argument for a peak and subsequent decline in nuclear capacity is very similar to the logistical considerations behind Peak Oil – the big pool of reactors we currently use will start to become exhausted, and we’re not building quite enough replacements. The rise after 2037 comes from my estimate that we will then be building 10 reactors per year compared to 6 per year today. The net outcome is that in 2050 nuclear power will be supplying about the same amount of energy that it is today.
A number of factors may act to increase that output. Those changes could include the uprating of existing reactors to produce more power than their original design specification, an increase in the size of future reactors and/or a building boom prompted by concerns about global warming and the decline of oil and gas supplies.
Restraining the increase will be economic factors (construction will become more expensive as oil and gas deplete, driving up the cost of materials and transportation), and continuing public opposition to nuclear power plants, waste storage and uranium mining. At some point uranium mining itself may also become a bottleneck – the current world production of about 50,000 tonnes of uranium per year could need to increase to around 70,000 tonnes per year in order to fuel the increased number of reactors. Of course the amount of additional uranium required will depend entirely on the number of new plants that actually get built.
A number of advanced reactor technologies are presently under investigation or development, including high energy “fast reactors”that produce less waste, reactors that can use more abundant and cheaper thorium as a fuel, and “pebble bed” designs that promise improved safety. None of these technologies are commercially available (and are unlikely to be within the next decade or two), so they have not been incorporated into the model.
Renewable energy includes such sources as wind, photovoltaic and thermal solar, tidal and wave power, biomass etc. Assessing their probable contributions to the future energy mix is one of the more difficult balancing acts encountered in the construction of the model. The whole renewable energy industry is still in its infancy. At the moment, therefore, it shows little impact but enormous promise. While the global contribution is still minor (at the moment non-hydro renewable technologies supply about 1% of the world’s total energy needs) its growth rate is exceptional. Wind power, for example, has experienced annual growth rates of 30% over the last decade, and solar power is doing about as well, though from a lower starting point.
Proponents of renewable energy point to the enormous amount of research being conducted and to the wide range of approaches being explored. They also point out correctly that the incentive is enormous: the development of renewable alternatives is crucial for the sustainability of human civilization. All this awareness, work, and promise give the nascent industry an aura of strength verging on invincibility, which in turn supports a conviction among its promoters that all things are possible.
Of course, the real world is full of unexpected constraints and unwarranted optimism. One such constraint has shown up in the field of biofuels, where a realization of the conflict between food and fuel has recently broken through into public consciousness. One can also see excessive public optimism at work in the same field, where dreams of replacing the world’s gasoline with ethanol and biodiesel are now struggling against the limits of low net energy in biological processes.
The key questions in developing a believable model are, what is the probable growth rate of renewable energy over the next 50 years, and what amount of energy will it ultimately contribute? I do not subscribe to the pessimistic notion that renewables will make little significant contribution. However, I think it’s equally unrealistic to expect that they will achieve a dominant position in the energy marketplace, due to their late start and their continuing economic disadvantage relative to coal.
In order to project realistic growth rates for renewable energy sources I have used the same mathematical approach as I used for hydro. Data on recent global production of wind, solar photovoltaic and other forms of renewable energy was used as the starting point for the projections. Excel trend lines were fitted to the data and the equations generated in the process were used to extrapolate the growth of each source. As we saw previously, the closeness of the fits as demonstrated by the R-squared values on the graphs gives a certain degree of confidence in the projections.
These projections should be treated with a great deal of caution. Because both the wind and solar power industries are still so new, it is possible that they may exhibit higher growth rates in the future, thus making the following projections too conservative. On the other hand they may run into unexpected constraints that would skew the outcome in a more pessimistic direction. Due to the youth of the industry there is very little historical production data to use in establishing the trends. This scarcity of data makes statistical projections less trustworthy, as large discontinuities in production from year to year may render the curve fits unreliable. On the other hand, there is at least some basis for the projections beyond the enthusiasm of the proponents or the gainsaying of their detractors. The projections should be regarded more as thought experiments – do they seem reasonable given your own assumptions of how the energy world works? If they seem unreasonable (either too high or too low), what is the evidence that will dispute them?
Data on the global production of wind energy from 1997 to 2005, collected by the World Wind Energy Association and reprinted inthis graphic, was used as the starting point for the projection shown in Figure 8. The closeness of the fit of the calculated curve to the actual production data, as indicated by the R-squared value of .998, gives us a reasonable degree of confidence in the projection.
Figure 8: Actual and Projected Wind Power, 1997 to 2050
There are a number of factors that may act on the future development of wind power. There is no doubt that it is an attractive replacement for coal or gas-fired electricity generation, at least within the limits imposed by the inherent variability of wind power. If that limitation can be addressed, either through cheaper energy storage techniques to bridge periods of low wind or smart grids that can tolerate larger amounts of variable power, a significant constraint to rapid and extensive wind development may be removed. The other potential constraint is the ever-present threat of oil and natural gas depletion. The rising cost of oil and gas may drive the cost of industrial production of all kinds up sharply before wind power has achieved a significant presence.
As in the case of nuclear power there will be pressures to speed up the development of wind power because of global warming and the depletion of oil and gas, as well as restraining forces imposed by economics, technical feasibility and perhaps some public resistance to having turbines in their neighborhood.
All in all, with a projected growth of 2200% from now until 2050 it looks as though wind is the renewable energy source that will make the most difference to the world’s energy mix over the next 50 years.
The data for actual solar photovoltaic production were compiled from here, here and here. This time, a third order polynomial was used to project the historical trend based on data from 1996 to 2006, and once again the fit is good enough to give some confidence that the observed trend is real. Though the growth of solar power in percentage terms is spectacular (an increase of 12,000% by 2050), given the lower starting point the contribution of solar power in 2050 will amount to only half that of wind. However, wind and solar technologies are different enough in their application that this amount of solar power should make a dramatic difference in the lives of many around the world.
Figure 9: Actual and Projected Solar Power, 1996 to 2050
In the category of “other renewables” we have such sources as geothermal, biomass, tidal power etc. Production figures for these sources were obtained from the Energy Information Agency. After removing the contribution of wind power from the aggregated figures, the historical production was again projected mathematically. In this case a linear trend line provided the best fit, which seems sensible – biomass is the largest contributor, and it is a very mature energy source, unlikely to exhibit exponential growth in the near future.
Figure 10: Other Renewable Energy Production, 1990 to 2100
Putting the Energy Sources in Perspective
Figure 11: Energy Use by Source, 1965 to 2100
Figure 11 shows all the above curves on a single graph, giving us a sense of the relative timing of the various production peaks as well as the rates of increase or decline of the different sources. As you can see, fossil fuels are by far the most important contributors to the world’s current energy mix, but oil and natural gas will decline rapidly over the coming decades. By the middle of the century the dominant player is coal, with oil, gas, hydro, nuclear power and renewables making very similar contributions to the world’s mid-century energy supply.
Figure 12: The Global Energy Mix in 1965, 2005 and 2050
Figure 12 shows the changing contribution of each energy source relative to the others over time. There are three interesting things to note about this progression.
The first is the large role that coal plays in the global supply picture. That situation is not entirely unexpected, but it hints at the difficulty we will have trying to replace our dirtiest and most dangerous energy source as our supplies of oil and gas decline.
The second is the increasing diversity of energy sources over time. This change is a good thing, as it indicates that various regions will have a much wider range of energy options available to them than in the past.
Finally, by mid-century energy sources that do not generate greenhouse gases may be supplying 40% of the world’s power as opposed to 13% today and only 5% in 1965. Combined with an overall (albeit involuntary) reduction in global energy use by 2050, that shift bodes well for reducing the carbon dioxide our civilization exhales into the atmosphere.
Figure 13: Total Energy Use, 1965 to 2100
Figure 13 has all the energy curves added together to show the overall shape of total world energy consumption. This graph aggregates all the rises, peaks and declines to give a sense of the complete energy picture. The graph shows a strong peak in about 2020, with an ongoing decline out to 2050. The main reason for the decline is the loss of oil and gas. The decline is cushioned by an increase in hydro and renewables over the middle of the century, and averages out to 1% per year.
Fuel vs. Electricity
The energy we use can be broadly categorized into two classes, fuel and electricity. The former consists of oil and gas, the two sources that will be in decline over the next half century. The amount of electricity we produce from all other sources including coal will increase, though not enough to offset the decline in fuels in terms of the energy they supply. Figure 14 shows show how the split between the two classes of energy will change over the next 45 years.
Figure 14: Fuel and Electricity Use, Today and 2050
In addition to the loss of transportation mobility it represents, the loss of the enormous contributions of oil and natural gas means that the total amount of energy available to humanity by the middle of the century may be only 70% of the amount we use now. That shortfall contains an ominous message for our future that is the subject of the next section.
The Effect of Energy Decline on the World’s Population
World Population Estimate
In order to assess the impact of declining energy supplies on the world’s future population, we first need to establish what that population will be.
In the past I have argued that a drastic reduction in the world’s population was likely over the course of the coming century. That expectation was based on my estimate of the impact of energy shortages, fresh water depletion, soil fertility depletion, the decimation of oceanic fish stocks, pollution, biodiversity loss, climate change and economic disruption. It is very hard to make that case, however – not because the problems I list aren’t apparent, but because the causal links to human population decline are very difficult to establish conclusively.
Accordingly, for this analysis I have adopted the generally accepted population projection published by the United Nations: a decreasing rate of growth to a population of about 9 billion in 2050. This projection is known as the Medium Fertility Case. As you can see from the graph in Figure 15 it matches perfectly with the projected trend of actual population growth over the last 20 years.
Figure 15: Actual and projected World Population Growth, 1985 to 2050
The Effect on Average Per Capita Energy
One of the interesting, though very high-level, ways to measure of global wealth is to calculate the average energy available to each person on earth. While the resulting per capita average doesn’t reflect the disparity between rich and poor individuals or nations or let us know what sorts of things people might do with their energy endowments, it can give us a general feeling for how “energy-wealthy” the average global citizen is, especially compared to other times.
Fortunately, the energy analysis we have just completed gives us the tool we need to establish this measure. By simply dividing the total energy available in each year by that year’s population we can construct the graph shown in Figure 16.
Figure 16: Global Average Per Capita Energy Consumption, 1965 to 2050
As you can see, the rising population and falling energy supply combine to produce a falling per capita energy curve. In fact, if these models of energy and population are correct, we can expect to see a drop of almost 50% in average per capita energy by 2050, from 1.7 toe/person to 0.9 toe/person. Each person alive in 2050 will have available, on average, only half the energy they would have today.
The Effect on Countries
Unfortunately the world is not a uniform place, and measures like “average per capita energy” don’t really tell us much about how the world might look in 2050. To gain a bit more insight it is helpful to think of the world as being composed of rich and poor nations, where their wealth is characterized by their total energy consumption and whose population growth is expressed in their Total Fertility Rate.
An interesting insight appears when you sort the world’s nations by their per capita energy consumption. The nations and regions at the bottom of the consumption scale (Africa, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Peru, Indonesia and much of Southeast Asia) all have very high fertility rates, well over the replacement rate of 2.1 children per woman. In fact, when normalized for population size, the average TFR of the poor nations is 3.0. In contrast, the group containing all the other nations is well below the replacement fertility rate at around 1.8.
The implication is that poor nations are going to face double jeopardy. Their populations will increase even as their already low energy consumption drops further. In addition, as per capita energy consumption drops world-wide, some nations that are not currently considered “energy-poor” will be impoverished enough to join the group at the bottom, thereby swelling its ranks even further.
The Growing Divide Between Rich and Poor
In order to get some idea of the magnitude of this effect, I have associated each of the 63 countries or regional groupings in this analysis with their current population, total current energy consumption and their population in 2050. I have arbitrarily decided that a per capita consumption of 0.75 toe/yr is the dividing line between between poverty and wealth. 0.75 toe/yr is a bit less than half the present world average, and only one tenth of the energy consumed by an average American.
The countries and regions that currently fall below that poverty line include Bangladesh, Philippines, Pakistan, India, Peru, Indonesia, Ecuador, Colombia, Egypt, much of Africa, many Asian Pacific nations and some Eurasian countries. Altogether they have a population of about 3 billion people. The rest of the world’s nations, from Algeria to Kuwait, are in the rich half of 3.5 billion people.
In order to assess the effect of declining average per capita income, I decided to spread the pain evenly. The assumption is that most countries will see a similar drop in their level of energy consumption. While that expectation may not be completely realistic, it seems close enough for the purpose of this exercise. The result is that countries with a per capita consumption between 0.75 and 1.5 toe/person will lose enough energy to be counted in the group of poor nations.
The countries and regions that drop from rich to poor status include Algeria, Turkey, Mexico, Thailand, much of Central and South America, the non-oil-producing nations of the Middle East, and – most significantly – China.
When we add up the populations in 2050 of the rich nations that are left, it comes out to only 1.6 billion. Remember, their populations fell due to lower fertility, there are fewer of them and they lost China to the ranks of the poor.
The population of the poor nations is where the shock comes. Their total population in 2050 adds up to over 7 billion people. That number is more than the total population of the Earth today, all living at an energy level somewhere between Bangladesh and Egypt.
Figure 17: World Population at low and high energy consumption levels, today and 2050
How many ways are there to say the world is heading for hard times? Losing most of our oil is bad enough, and losing most of our gas as well borders on the catastrophic. Combining these losses with the exponential growth of those nations that can least afford it is nothing short of cataclysmic. The ramifications spread out like ripples on a pond. There will be 7 billion people who will need fertilizer and irrigation water to survive, but would be too poor to buy it even at today’s prices. Given the probable escalation in the costs of fertilizer and the diesel fuel or electricity for their water pumps, it isn’t hard to understand why the spread of famine in energy-poor regions of the world seems virtually inevitable.
In normal times the poor would appeal to the rest of the world for food aid. However, these times may be anything but normal. Even the shrinking population of the rich world will see its wealth eroded by the drop in energy supplies and the increasing cost of producing the energy they do have. This decline in their wealth will in turn erode any surpluses they might otherwise have donated to international aid. In any event, there will be over twice as many hungry mouths crying for that aid, with less and less of it available.
This assessment doesn’t even consider the converging and amplifying impacts of the other problems I mentioned above: the loss of soil fertility and fresh water, the death of the oceans, rising pollution, spreading extinctions and accelerating climate change.
The solution to this dilemma, if solution there may be, does not seem to lie in some Deus ex Machina or in a technological revision of the parable of the loaves and fishes. If the dark visions outlined in this article come true, we will be faced with a world in which the only way forward is to accept that Mother Nature does not negotiate. We must use our considerable intelligence to figure out ways to live within the ecological budget we have been allotted. More than that, we must change our values away from our current paradigm of growth, competition and exploitation to one of sustainability, cooperation and nurturing. The longer and tighter we cling to our present ways, the more damage we will ultimately inflict on ourselves and the world we live in. For many, the time for such a change has already passed. For a fortunate few there may yet be enough time to move toward the new ways of living and being that will be required in this brave new world.
Article by Paul Cherfaka, novelist, futurist.
SEEK Positive steps by positive people.
According to the world’ largest publicly traded company, EXXON, meeting energy demands in 2040 won’t be all that different from today.
Well that’s not entirely true, because as you will read below, we’re going to be getting a whole lot more efficient at managing the energy we use.
The full report is in-depth and fascinating, but as far as snap-shots go, this simple bar-chart does a good job of sumarising the situation. Most important to note is the fact that oil and gas usage will remain dominant, showing sizable increases. Exxon’s projections for renewable energy sources such as Wind, Solar, Gas, Hydro and Geo are rather pessimistic. They will increase, but barely enough to impact change. Only coal, which will peak in 2025, will decrease. These figures account for a gobal energy demand which will be 30 percent higher in three decades to come.
Given that Exxon is the world’s largest (non state-owned) producer of oil and gas, perhaps these projections aren’t all that surprising. But for those of you concerned about our planets health – they should certainly be alarming.
see full report:
Global energy demand will be about 30 percent higher in 2040 compared to 2010.
Energy demand growth will slow as economies mature, efficiency gains accelerate and population growth moderates.
In the countries belonging to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) we see energy use remaining essentially flat. Non OECD energy demand will grow by close to 60 percent.
By 2040, electricity generation will account for natural gas will grow fast enough to overtake coal for the number-two position.
For both oil and natural gas, an increasing share of global supply will come from unconventional sources, such as those from shale formations. Demand for natural gas will rise by more than 60 percent through 2040.
Demand for coal will peak and begin a gradual decline.
Gains in efficiency through energy-saving practices and technologies will temper demand growth and curb emissions.
Global energy-related carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions will grow slowly, then level off around 2030.
By The Numbers:
Energy notes: Energy in natural processes and human consumption, some numbers
The average person in the US consumes 60 barrels of oil (2520 gallons) per year and on average this is 10,000 watts of power consumption (the calculation is made relatively easy by consulting tables below and keeping track of units:
[2520 gallons /yr x 125 x 106 J/gallon ]/ [π x 107 sec./yr] = 1.00 x104 watts).
It is a useful coincidence that the number of seconds in a year is π x 107 to within half of one percent.
Rough Values of Power of Various Processes (watts)
Solar power in all directions 1027
Solar power incident on earth 1017
Solar power avg. on U.S. 1015
Solar power consumed in photosynthesis 1014
U.S. power consumption rate 1013
U.S. electrical power 1012
Large electrical generating plant 109
Automobile at 40 mph…note this is not the output
which only about 30% of the energy input..PBR 105
Solar power on roof of U.S. home 104
U.S. citizen consumption rate 104
Electric stove 104
Solar power per m2 on U.S. surface …this seems a little low…it’s 1342 watts per m2 outside the atmosphere, about 1000 watts per m2 at high noon on the ground, and on average (day and night) about 240 watts per meter2 absorbed at the ground. This is the average over the Earth too…PBR 102
One light bulb 102
Food consumption rate per capita U.S. 102
Electric razor 101
Energy Content of Fuels (in Joules)
Energy Unit Joules Equivalent (S.I.)
gallon of gasoline 1.3×108
AA battery 103
standard cubic foot of natural gas (SCF) 1.1×106
candy bar 106
barrel of crude oil (contains 42 gallons) 6.1×109
pound of coal 1.6 x 107
pound of gasoline 2.2 x 107
pound of oil 2.4 x 107
pound of Uranium-235 3.7 x 1013
ton of coal 3.2 x 1010
ton of Uranium-235 7.4 x 1016
Energy Unit Equivalent
1 Btu 1055 joules or 778 ftlb or 252 cal
1 calorie 4.184 joules
1 food Calorie 1000 calories or 1 kilocalorie
1 hp hr 2.68 x106 joules or 0.746 kwh
1 kwh 3.6 x 106 joules or 3413 Btu
1 eV 1.6×10-19joules
Fuel Requirements for a 1000MWe Power Plant =109 watts
(2.4 1011Btu/day energy input) =2.53×1014 joules/day = 2.9×109 watts = 2200 Mwatts thermal fuel energy
Coal: 9000 tons/day of 1 “unit train load” (100 90 – ton cars/day)
Oil: 40,000 bbl/day or 1 tanker per week (note: “bbl” means barrels)
Natural Gas: 2.4 l08SCF/day
Uranium (as 235U): 3 kg/dayNote: 1000 MWe utility, at 60% load factor, = 6 x 105 kw generates 5.3 x 109 kwh/year, enough for a city of about 1 million people in the U.S.A ; this is just their electricity needs, at about 0.6 kw per person
(Note: MWE is an abbreviation for megawatts-electrical output)
Global Energy Consumption
Global Energy consumption (marketable energy): about 400 exaJoules per year = 4 x 1020 J/yr
U.S. Total Energy Consumption (1990)= 82.11015 Btu (82.1 Quads) = 38.8 MBPD oil equivalent = 86.6×109
GJ = 86.6 exaJoule; (recall 1 Quad is a quadrillion (1015) BTU or 1.055 exaJoules (1.055 x 1018 Joules). Since 1990 we’ve gone up.
Everyday Usage and Energy Equivalencies
1 barrel of oil = 42 gallons: driving 1400 km (840 miles) in average car
1 kwh electricity = 1½ hours of operation of standard air conditioner = 92 days for electric clock = 24 hours for color TV
One million Btu equals approximately
90 pounds of coal
125 pounds of ovendried wood
8 gallons of motor gasoline 10 therms of natural gas
1.1 day energy consumption per capita in the U.S.
Power is the amount of energy used per unit time – or how fast energy is being used. If we multiply a unit of power by a unit of time, the result is a unit of energy.
Power Unit Equivalent
1 watt 1 joule/s or 3.41 Btu/hr
1 hp or 2545 Btu/hr or 746 watts
Power Converted to Watts
1 Btu per hour 0.293 W
1 joule per second 1 W
1 kilowatt-hour per day 41.7 W
1 food Calorie per minute 69.77 W
1 horsepower 745.7 W
1 kilowatt 1000 W
1 Btu per second 1054 W
1 gallon of gasoline per hour 39 kW
1 million barrels of oil per day 73 GW
Rough Values of the Energies of Various Events (Occurrence Energy) in (J)
Creation of the Universe 1068J
Emission from a radio galaxy 1055
E = mc2of the Sun 1047
Supernova explosion 1044
Yearly solar emission 1034
Earth moving in orbit 10
33D-D fusion energy possible from worlds oceans 1031
Earth spinning 1029
Earth’s annual sunshine 1025
Cretaceous-Tertiary extinction theory meteorite 1023
Energy available from earth’s fossil fuels 1023
Yearly U.S. sunshine 1023
tidal friction (which drives the moon slowly away from Earth and lengthens the day steadily) 1020
U.S. energy consumption 1020
Exploding volcano (Krakatoa) 1019
Severe earthquake (Richter 8) 1018
100-megaton H-bomb 1017
Fission one ton of Uranium 1017
E = mc2of 1 kilogram 1017
Burning a million tons of coal 1016
Energy to create Meteor Crater in Arizona 1016
1000-MW power station (1 year) 1016
Atomic Bomb (Hiroshima) 1014
E = mc2 of 1 gram 1014
Energy to put the space shuttle in orbit 1013
Energy used in one year per capita U.S. 1012
Atlantic crossing (one way) of jet airliner 1012
Saturn V rocket 1011
Energy to heat a house for one year 1011
D-D fusion energy possible from 1 gal. of water 1011
One year of electricity for the average house 1010
Lightening bolt 1010
Burning a cord of wood 1010
One gallon of gasoline 108
100-W light bulb left on for one day 107
Human daily diet 107
One day of heavy manual labor 107
Explosion of 1 kg of TNT 106
Woman running for 1 hr 106
Candy bar 106
Burning match 103
31AA battery (alkaline) 103
Hard-hit baseball 103
Lifting an apple 1 m 1
Human heartbeat 0.5
Depressing typewriter key 10-2
Cricket chirrup 10-3
Hopping flea 10-7
Proton accelerated to high energy (one trillion eV) 10-7
Fission of 1 uranium nucleus 10-11
Energy released in D-D fusion 10-12
Electron mass-energy 10-13
Chemical reaction per atom 10-18
Photon of light 10-19
Energy of room-temperature air molecule 10-21
Cost of Various Fuels
Type Unit Cost $/Unit
Cost $/Joule Uses
1Kwh=3.6x106J(3.6 MJ) $0.10
0.028 $/MJ = 2.8×10-8
Gasoline 1 gallon 2.00
0.013 $/MJ = 1.3 x 10-8
Natural Gas 1
similar to gasoline heating
AA battery 1 battery 0.80 0.8 x 10-3
Milky Way candy bar 1 bar 0.60
0.60/MJ = 0.6 x 10-6
(but note, although electricity is twice as expensive as gasoline per unit of energy, electric motors are typically much more efficient than gasoline engines, so that electricity as a fuel source can be competitive with gasoline). http://physics.ucsd.edu/~tmurphy/phys12/phys12.html
Worldwide Power Use – History
“Developed” countries average (1990):
• 1.2 billion people 7.5 kilowatts/per person = 9.0 terawatts
The rest of the world (1990):
• 4.1 billion people 1.1 kilowatts/person = 4.5 terawatts
(…we got a slightly different number for 2000…taking 400 exaJoules/year and
dividing by 6 Billion people gave 2.11 kw per person..average power consumption..24
hrs a day!..has it changed?
Get off the Grid
300 years in 300 seconds
Who killed economic Growth
end fossil fuel dependence
peak oik from club of Rome
Putting renewables into scale